Back to all publications...

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines

Frontier AI developers are relying on layers of safeguards to protect against catastrophic misuse of AI systems. Anthropic guards their latest Claude 4 Opus model using one such defense pipeline, and other frontier developers including Google DeepMind and OpenAI pledge to soon deploy similar defenses. However, the security of such pipelines is unclear, with limited prior work evaluating or attacking these pipelines. We address this gap by developing and red-teaming an open-source defense pipeline. 1 First, we find that a novel few-shot-prompted input and output classifier outperforms state-of-the-art open-weight safeguard model ShieldGemma across three attacks and two datasets, reducing the attack success rate (ASR) to 0% on the catastrophic misuse dataset ClearHarm. Second, we introduce a STaged AttaCK (STACK) procedure that achieves 71% ASR on ClearHarm in a black-box attack against the few-shot-prompted classifier pipeline. Finally, we also evaluate STACK in a transfer setting, achieving 33% ASR, providing initial evidence that it is feasible to design attacks with no access to the target pipeline. We conclude by suggesting specific mitigations that developers could use to thwart staged attacks.


Ian R. McKenzie, Oskar John Hollinsworth, Tom Tseng, Xander Davies, Stephen Casper, Aaron David Tucker, Robert Kirk, Adam Gleave
AAAI
[paper]

Are you looking to do a PhD in machine learning? Did you do a PhD in another field and want to do a postdoc in machine learning? Would you like to visit the group?

How to apply


Contact

We are located at
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
Wolfson Building
Parks Road
OXFORD
OX1 3QD
UK
Twitter: @OATML_Oxford
Github: OATML
Email: oatml@cs.ox.ac.uk